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A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTNE ON THE LENINIST LEGACY IN EASTERN EUROPE
BARBARA GEDDES University of California, Los Angeles I nstitutions reflect the interests of those who devise them. This assertion is as true in contemporary Eastern Europe as it is in other times and places. If one knows who makes institutional choices and how they expect the various alternatives to affect their interests, then one can predict what choices will be made. Consequently, to determine the effect of the Leninist political legacy on democratic institutions in Eastern Europe, one needs to look at how 40 years of Leninism affected the interests of the individuals who found themselves deliberating over the content of new constitutions and electoral laws during and immediately after transitions from communism. This study examines the formation of these interests, with special emphasis on the kind of party system that emerges during post-Leninist transitions and the effects of such fluid and fragmented parties on the institutional choices made by the self-interested politicians who belong to them.
This study thus builds on earlier literature that emphasized the distinctiveness of post-Leninist transitions as compared to other transitions from authoritarianism (e.g., Ekiert, 1992; Jowitt, 1992) . It seeks to extend these initial insights by using a detailed and concrete comparison of political outcomes in Latin America and Eastern Europe to identify the elements of the Leninist political and institutional legacy that are truly unusual and to develop some theoretically informed speculations about their consequences.
When the recent transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe are compared to similar transitions in Latin America, several differences distinguish the post-Leninist experience from the others: the dominance of political arenas by newly created parties in the wake of the "Leninist extinction";
1 the sudden expansion of meaningful political participation to the entire population in one fell swoop; and the weakness of interest-based organizations, especially those that reflect the interests of labor. These differences, although perhaps not the most immediately obvious to the average observer, have consequential effects for the kinds of democratic political systems initiated during transitions and hence for the political feasibility of economic liberalization and future political stability.
This study has four main sections. The first compares post-Communist party systems to other postauthoritarian party systems, demonstrating the greater importance of new parties in the formerly Leninist systems. The second discusses the effect on new parties of the weakness of prior interest group organization and sudden, as opposed to incremental, increases in political participation. The third shows the institutional consequences of the differences noted in the first and second sections; it demonstrates the strong 1. This striking metaphor comes from Jowitt ( 1992) . Growth, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research. relationship between the interests of leaders of new parties and the kinds of democratic institutions created during transitions from authoritarianism. And the fourth section offers some predictions about the probable longer term effects of the distinctive features of the Leninist legacy identified in earlier sections.
Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. I owe even more to Ken Jowitt, who sparked my longstanding (although not previously public) interest in East em
The East European countries examined for this study are Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. These are the countries in the first wave of transitions in which borders remained stable. I concentrate here on the earliest transitions because they are the ones that have gone far enough to allow some conclusions to be drawn.
2 I have limited the sample to those that neither split nor fused so as to focus on the Leninist institutional legacy, excluding complicating and overwhelming factors such as violent ethnic nationalism and civil war (evidence of one of the other Leninist legacies, suppressed nationalism). Both of these biases in the sample may affect the generalizability of conclusions. The countries that experienced the earliest transitions may be systematically different from those that experienced them later in ways that have long-term consequences. Only future research will show whether this difference is important. More obviously, countries in which the mobilization of intense ethnic nationalism has led to civil war and the creation of new states are likely to differ from the countries considered here. The Latin American material draws primarily on the experiences of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, countries at levels of development comparable with the range in Eastern Europe. All have experienced at least one transition to democracy since World War II.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE INTERESTS OF INSTITUTION BUILDERS
The argument made here begins with two assumptions: Those who make institutional changes pursue their own individual interests above all else and their interests center on furthering their political careers. Insofar as these interests remain stable-as they do in most times and places-political institutions will exhibit stability, even in what seem to be fluid political environments. Political institutions change only when, for whatever reason, they fail to serve the career interests of those with direct power to change them.
In advancing this argument, I do not deny that political leaders prefer some substantive policies over others. But for politicians considering institutional changes, interest in furthering their careers usually converges with interest in achieving policy goals. Often, the same institutions that will improve their chances of winning elections will also improve their chances of achieving policy goals because the greater the likelihood that they and their party allies will be elected, the greater the chance of passing the legislation they favor. As a first approximation, then, one can say that, when making decisions about institutional changes, politicians put their own career interests first and that they pursue their own (or their constituents') policy preferences by seeking to maximize their own power in government. This political self-interest proposition has clear behavioral implications. To further their careers, politicians need, above all, to be elected and reelected. They will thus prefer institutions-parties, electoral rules, constitutional provisions-that give them an electoral advantage over others.
If there is widespread concern among voters about a particular institutional change, many politicians will choose issue positions that reflect the preferences of voters; this is the best way, given an issue of high salience, to pursue future electoral success. If, however, as is usually the case, voters have little knowledge about or interest in institutional issues, politicians will decide on the basis of the effect they expect the change in rules itself to have on their own reelection chances. Politicians with high name recognition, for example, will favor open-list to closed-list proportional representation (PR) because their personal popularity will do them more good in the former system than in the latter.
COMPARISON OF POST-COMMUNIST AND POST-AUTHORITARIAN PARTY SYSTEMS
From a comparative perspective, one of the most notable features of the post-Communist transitions is the low survival rate of the parties that had influenced political life prior to Leninist hegemony and the modest success in the new political environment of the few "historic" parties that did survive. In comparison to other forms of authoritarian rule, Leninist regimes made a much more thorough sweep of preexisting political organizations. In none of the East European countries examined for this study did a party that had existed prior to the Leninist regime receive more than 12% of the vote in the first competitive election. By contrast, pre-authoritarian parties won the presidency and largest plurality in the legislature in all but one of the first elections after recent democratizations in South America (see Table 1 ).
lllSTORIC PARTIES
The opposition of Leninist rulers to all other organizations and the ruthlessness with which the most apparently benign manifestations of the human tendency to gather in groups (e.g., stamp collectors' clubs, Girl Scouts) were co-opted or suppressed has been noted by many observers. Few of the political organizations suppressed by Leninist governments have survived to reemerge after the fall of Communist governments. Some longrepressed traditional parties joined the scramble for votes in the first democratic elections in the East European countries, but despite their impeccable credentials as dissidents and noncollaborators (an important political resource almost everywhere), they failed to attract many new adherents. The votes they got came disproportionately from the elderly (Korosenyi, 1992) . Leaders of other traditional parties, long co-opted as loyal opposition in Communist regimes, also failed to attract support initially, 3 despite their advantage in terms of preexisting party organization, another scarce and valuable political resource. As a result of the failure of traditional parties to survive and prosper in the new democratic environment, the political institutions-electoral rules, forms of representation-with which they were symbiotically entwined have also failed to reemerge.
Within Eastern Europe, the disappearance of historic parties is usually seen as a consequence of the short periods of competitive politics and correspondingly weak parties prior to the Leninist seizures of power, intense repression, the remarkably thorough penetration of society made possible by party control of the economy as well as of the government, and the passage of time. With so many forces converging to prevent party survival, no further explanation seems necessary. When one looks at Latin American and Southern European transitions, however, the arguments used to explain the disappearance of historic parties in Eastern Europe seem insufficient to explain differences in survival.
Among the Latin American cases, repression was most severe in Argentina and Chile, where documented cases of government torture and murder number in the thousands, and in Uruguay, which had the highest number of political prisoners per capita in the world during the 1970s. Historic parties Note. The largest party in the lower house of the legislature is shown in bold. (In Colombia, because of the National Front agreement, both parties received the same number of seats.) Historic parties are parties that existed prior to the authoritarian or Leninist interlude. I have included parties that were disbanded at the initiation of the authoritarian regime and then reorganized afterward, and also parties that were allowed to continue to exist as co-opted "allies" of the ruling party as long as they maintained an organization separate from that of the ruling party. They are shown here if they received at least 3% of the vote and at least one seat in the postauthoritarian legislature. Sources. Argentina: Banks (1986, p. 26); Brazil: Anglade (1986, p. 165) ; Chile: Scully (1992, pp. 190-198) , Angell (1990, pp. 243-244) ; Colombia: Hartlyn (1988, pp. 150-151) ; Peru: Keesings Contemporary Archives (Vol. 26, October 31, 1980, p. 30546) ; Uruguay: Rial (1985, p. 11); Venezuela: Ruddle and Gillette (1972, p. 100); Bulgaria: Troxel (1993, pp. 408-410) ; Hungary: Korosenyi (1992, p. 77); Poland: Taras (1993, p. 27); Romania: Europa World Year Book 1992 (Vol. 2, 1992 , p. 2316 survived in all three. By contrast, in Brazil, the only Latin American country in which most preauthoritarian parties failed to survive, levels of repression were relatively low (Stepan, 1988, pp. 69-70) .
Furthermore, although most Latin American countries had experienced longer periods of democracy prior to the imposition of authoritarianism, not all had. At the initiation of the current democratic regime in 1958, Venezuela had previously enjoyed only 3 years of competitive politics in its entire history. Nevertheless, the same three parties that had emerged during that 3-year democratic period dominated competition in the frrst election after the overthrow of the military, and two of them have survived as the strongest parties up to the present time. Peru's experience with democracy has also been quite limited, but parties have usually survived periods of authoritarian rule.
Nor is the sheer passage of time sufficient to explain the difference in survival rates, although it undoubtedly contributes. The East European Leninist regimes lasted slightly more than 40 years; the leaders of the historic parties during the more-or-less democratic interludes from 1945 to 1948, if they were still alive, were old men by 1989, and their age is often mentioned as a reason for their lack of current success. A number of these sometimes heroic and sometimes cantankerous elderly leaders fought to reestablish their parties and mobilize supporters for the first post-Communist elections. A few of the historic parties, such as the Hungarian Smallholders Party and the Romanian National Liberals, achieved moderate success. Most failed. By contrast, party leaders from the preauthoritarian period not only successfully mobilized their parties but won the contested presidential elections that followed authoritarian interludes in about half of the Latin American cases: Argentina (1973) , 4 Chile, Brazil (1985) , 5 Colombia, Venezuela (1958 ), and Peru (1956 and 1980 . Several ofthese-Per6n in Argentina, Aylwin in Chile, Neves in Brazil, and Prado in Peru-were, like the leaders of East European historic parties, over 70 years old when elected, and so age by itself is an insufficient explanation for the political failure of the historic East European parties.
Spanish experience with party survival falls between that of Eastern Europe and Latin America. Spain is one of the very few countries in the world to have experienced a nontraditional authoritarian regime as long-lived as the Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe. Franco, like East European Communist leaders, assiduously prevented the organization of competing groups or parties. When the Franco government ended, the Spanish Communist party emerged from underground and proved initially capable of mobilizing a considerable amount of support. The Socialist Party was reestablished and by 1982, had become the strongest party in parliament. On the right, however, no historic party made a claim on citizens' loyalties. Instead, new parties were organized. A new center-right party won the first elections but has since disintegrated, whereas the Socialists seem to have made substantial progress in developing stable partisan loyalties within a large sector of the electorate (Barnes, McDonough, & L6pez Pina, 1985) .
These experiences suggest that the survival of preauthoritarian parties depends not only on the effectiveness of repression and the length of time they are suppressed but also on the positive incentives that authoritarian governments provide to those with a vocation for politics to join and expend their energies in regime-sponsored parties. When an authoritarian regime simply outlaws parties, they go underground. They continue to exist, although in much reduced fashion, even in jail. The parties lose contact with casual adherents and are prevented from attracting new supporters, but committed activists maintain clandestine networks. If unions or some other kinds of well-organized groups remain incompletely suppressed or co-opted, then former party activists find opportunities in them to continue their vocation for politics and build limited networks of support. Unions played 4. Hector campora ran as a stand-in for Juan Per6n in the 1973 election. Soon after taking office, he held a second election, which Peron duly won. Some might exclude Per6n from the category of leaders of historic parties because his party and government were only imperfectly democratic. I have included him on the grounds that he was elected in a fair and competitive election in 1946, and his party was no more undemocratic than several of the interwar East European parties now claiming democratic credentials.
5. Tancredo Neves, whose prominent role in the Partido Social Democratico extended back to the 1950s, was indirectly elected president of Brazil by an electoral college in 1984. He never served as president because he died before he could be inaugurated.
an important role in the survival of historic parties in Spain, Chile, and, to a lesser extent, several other South American countries. Consequently, when dictatorships, in preparing to relinquish power, allowed the reemergence of parties, old parties arose phoenix-like from the ashes of repression.
When, by contrast, the authoritarian government creates new parties, it creates a new set of political interests. Given a choice between participation in politics within a narrowly circumscribed arena accompanied by real opportunities for upward mobility in the new party, on the one hand, and a life of obscurity and possibly danger in the underground, on the other, many activists from the old parties find places in the new party-as do many with a vocation for politics who come of age after the authoritarian seizure of power and large numbers of opportunists. With the political energies of the politically active siphoned off into competitions, struggles, and debates within the newly created party system, historic parties find it harder to survive. Even movements in opposition to the regime often develop within the new authoritarian party system rather than outside it. Poland during the 1980s is the obvious exception to this statement, but opposition movements in Brazil, Czechoslovakia during the late 1960s, and Hungary during the 1980s flourished within government-sanctioned parties.
In the set of cases examined here, all the Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe created new party systems, and preexisting parties have emerged strong in none of them. Among the Latin American cases, the Brazilian military regime is the only one that created a new party system, and Brazil is the only Latin American country in which the party system to emerge after the authoritarian interlude is almost entirely different from the one in existence before, even though many of the same individuals continue to be active in politics. Spain is an intermediate case. No parties were created by the Franco government, but Franco supporters were mobilized into the loosely organized Movimiento. Historic parties of the left in Spain (those that had been repressed) emerged stronger than ever after democratization, but historic parties of the right (those that had been co-opted) failed to survive.
PARTIFS THAT SUPPORTED THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME
The Leninist parties themselves have proved surprisingly adaptable as organizations, although not necessarily as representatives of the interests traditionally associated with them. The successor parties initially suffered dramatic declines in the countries in which opposition movements had had a chance to organize before the collapse (Hungary and Poland), but they subsequently reemerged organizationally strong, politically wily, and much more programmatically flexible than observers had expected. They appear to have succeeded in transforming themselves into effective competitive parties. In the countries that lacked significant reform movements prior to the collapse (Bulgaria and Romania), successor parties initially faced much weaker challenges. Despite weaker opposition, they, like successor parties in Poland and Hungary, have experienced considerable turnover in top personnel and strong pressures toward fragmentation. These parties also seem to have made considerable progress in the transition to becoming competitive parties. Successor party organizations still control enormous political resources, especially in local government, the state sector of the economy, and the media. But they are new in the sense that-like the other parties-they cannot count on the loyalty of any substantial segment of the population and so must engage in unremitting efforts to attract support.
Among the ex-Communist countries, the initial fate of the successors to the Leninist parties depended on whether or not organized movements of dissidents had existed prior to the collapse. In the countries with a history of dissidence, the successor parties polled between 10% and 15% of the vote in the first competitive elections. These percentages are fairly similar to the proportions polled by the Partido Democnitico Social, the party created to support the military authoritarian government in Brazil, and the Uni6n Democnitica Independiente, the party most closely identified with support for the Pinochet government in Chile. In most Latin American authoritarianisms, no support party was created, and no party of national significance admitted to supporting the authoritarian regime during the transition (see Table 2 ). The Latin American military regimes, like the Polish regime, faced widespread, well-organized, and fully articulate dissident movements prior to redemocratization.
This prior organization and spread of opposition resulted in low levels of support for parties identified with the authoritarian regime in the first free election. As long as the media are controlled and opposition groups are not permitted to mobilize political campaigns that disseminate their views to large numbers of people, most people's opinions, as expressed in surveys and votes, will reflect the ideas carried in the controlled media. The opinions shaped by a controlled media are highly volatile, however, and subject to rapid and radical change once people are exposed to competing points of view (Geddes & Zaller, 1989) . Political elites in Eastern Europe, like military rulers in Latin America before them, were surprised by the rapid disintegration of regime support once the articulation of opposition views became possible.
In Poland, Solidarity's long history of opposition and the quasi-legalization of samizdat publications during the economic reforms of the 1980s created an opposition information flow that had already reached a significant part of the population long before the first fully competitive elections in 1991 (Zubek, 1991, pp. 356-357) . As a result, popular opposition to the Communist regime in Poland had become widespread and highly visible. The disintegration of support for the Hungarian Communist Party occurred more as a result of changes from within the party than because of mobilized opposition. Party reforms during the late 1980s led to the release of large numbers of positions from the nomenklatura, and budget cuts and the streamlining of party organizations in state enterprises led to the dismissal of many party functionaries. These and other changes within the party organization fundamentally altered the incentives for belonging to the party, and membership dropped accordingly. In one Budapest district, in 1988 nearly 10 times as many members deserted the party as had left in 1985 (Csanadi, 1991 (Csanadi, , p. 1092 . In Bulgaria and Romania, by contrast, where the old regime fell as a result of coups carried out by reform Communists after the withdrawal of Soviet support and potential opposition had almost no prior organization and little time to organize before the first election, successors won the first elections. These early successes do not necessarily portend long-term success, however. Hard times in combination with the newly freed media can be expected to decrease support for any incumbent party. Support for the successor Bulgarian Socialist Party declined 13% between the frrst election in June 1990 and the second one less than a year and a half later. Successor parties' long-term survival will depend on how successfully they transform themselves into parties able to compete for support.
Successor parties, like others in the new systems, have also shown a strong tendency to fragment. Among the dynamics inherent in even seriously flawed competitive regimes is the tendency of leadership competition within parties to lead to party splits-even when the splits undermine party dominance or reduce the probability of winning the following election. Individual leaders can often increase their own electoral chances by leading a faction of supporters out of a party and thus ensuring their own nomination by this faction even though in the process they decrease the overall chances of both factions of the old party. In established party systems, such splits are less frequent because voters' established party loyalties create barriers to the entry of new parties, but in new party systems these barriers are low. Such a split ended the dominance of the Romanian successor party. 6 No successor party in Latin America is currently as strong as successor parties in Eastern Europe. Parties based on support for former dictators have, however, played important roles in the politics of several South American countries in the past. At least four populist dictators succeeded in organizing parties from among their supporters that survived their overthrows during the 1940s or 1950s. The two parties created from the political machine that supported the Gerulio Vargas dictatorship from 1937 to 1945 dominated democratic politics in Brazil for nearly 20 years, from 1946 to 1964. Vargas was himself elected to the presidency in a fair and competitive election in 1950. The Partido Justicialista created by Juan Peron during the 1940s survived his overthrow and years of repression to reemerge during the current democratic period once again as one of the two strongest parties in Argentina. Peruvian dictator Manuel Odria and Colombian dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla also put together parties that mounted successful legislative campaigns for their supporters and nearly successful presidential campaigns for themselves for a number of years after their ousters.
These parties were closely linked to the popular personalities of the dictators but never advocated a return to authoritarianism. The relatively successful former Latin American dictators were genuinely popular. Their governments had been associated with the distribution of real benefits to the urban lower classes. Those able to thrive later in a democratic environment succeeded in attracting and organizing large numbers of supporters. The long-term survival of East European successor parties will depend on their development of the same skills. The Latin American successor parties to survive the death of their founders were also able to establish privileged positions in the state bureaucracies and, like most other successful Latin American parties, make use of state resources to establish clientele networks and thus solidify political support. East European parties are, of course, attempting to use state resources in the same way (note complaints about the Hungarian Democratic Forum while it held office), but economic decline and liberalization reduce state resources and hence the opportunities for the political use of state resources.'
CONSEQUENCES OF LOW RATES OF PARTY SURVIVAL
As a result of the Leninist legacy, party systems in new East European democracies tend to be dominated by new parties and newly competitive successor parties to which neither leaders nor followers feel much loyalty. Party splits, fragmentation, and electoral volatility should thus come as no surprise, especially when times are hard and where electoral rules (such as easy party registration, PR, and low representation thresholds) do not discourage the formation of new parties. The two most volatile and fragmented party systems in the world during the early 1990s were those of Brazil and Poland (before the introduction of a 5% representation threshold).
THE EFFECT OF SUDDEN LARGE EXTENSIONS OF PARTICIPATION
At the beginning of a new democracy, a free-for-all occurs among the very large number of individuals (and the organizations they create) who suddenly perceive new opportunities and discover in themselves a vocation for politics. In Romania, more than 200 parties initially registered, and between 50 and 100 has been the norm in Eastern Europe (and Brazil). To extend the Leninist 7. This process is also occurring in Latin America-although not so dramatically-as a result of the debt crisis and economic liberalization. As a consequence, parties traditionally reliant on state resources, such as Acci6n Democratica in Venezuela, have been seriously undermined, and corruption scandals have multiplied as politicians have sought to find private sources (through kickbacks and bribes) for the resources they used to receive from the state (see Geddes & Ribeiro, 1992) .
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Copyright (c) Sage Publications, Inc. extinction metaphor, a large, rich ecological niche has suddenly opened, and many seek to be the ones to occupy it. As in the natural world, survival and reproductive success belong not only to the fittest but to the first. Those who manage to establish themselves initially have an advantage over competitors who arrive later because the pioneers control the design of new institutions and can thus shape the political environment in ways that benefit themselves and erect barriers to the entry of potential competitors. Because the stakes are high and the rules of the game are uncertain and unsettled, competition is fierce and unruly.
Parties demonstrate their "fitness" by attracting support, mostly in the form of votes. In their struggle for votes, these new parties face an electorate that, in comparative perspective, has some unusual characteristics. First and most obviously, few have developed party loyalties. This is so not only because most parties are new, but also because the transitions were caused by the collapse of an external power rather than the growth of organized internal opposition (except in Poland) that could have mobilized widespread support and loyalty for opposition movements. Even in Poland, Solidarity's success as an opposition movement has not created stable partisan loyalties, because the intensity and complexity of competition among leaders within Solidarity led to a splintering of the movement, accompanied by rapidly changing and hard-to-follow issue positions among the splinters. Second, the transition from no effective participation to universal suffrage, although it has precedents in the developing world, distinguishes Eastern Europe from Western Europe and much of Latin America. Third, interest groups are weak. Communist-dominated interest organizations have declined or disintegrated, and new ones are at an early stage of organization (with the partial exception of Poland).
THE WEAKNESS OF PARTISAN LOYALTIES
The consequence of the near absence of partisan loyalty is to broaden the area within which intense competition among parties occurs. In most democratic political systems, competition occurs at the margins, mostly for less committed voters, individuals whose interests place them in the interstices between existing parties, and new voters. Before and after the extension of suffrage to new groups, competition intensifies as parties attempt to attract the unusually large number of new voters. In contemporary Eastern Europe, almost all votes are up for grabs. The near absence of preexisting party loyalties not only increases the stakes and unpredictability of early electoral contests, it also contributes to the unpredictability and apparent opportunism of party behavior. In an established democratic system, a party that tradition- ally counts on the votes of particular groups cannot deviate too far from its traditional policy positions without risking the loss of its traditional support base. Even if party leaders in an established system are entirely opportunistic, cost/benefit calculations will lead to considerable issue stability within parties over time. A different calculus prevails in contemporary Eastern Europe, and parties often make radical changes in their issue positions as they try to attract voters.
EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE
The rapidity of the expansion of participation also has consequences for the kinds of parties that are likely to emerge. When suffrage expands incrementally, as it did in most of Western Europe, party systems form early on (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) , and many of the unenfranchised develop attitudes of loyalty or identification toward existing parties (Przeworski, 1975) . Consequently, the incremental extension of suffrage to these citizens may result in a realignment if, for example, the urban working class is enfranchised in one large increment but does not usually result in great electoral volatility. In Lipset and Rokkan's terms, party systems tend to freeze prior to the inclusion of most of the population, and newly enfranchised members of the working class either join existing parties or supply the raw material for the formation of a new party, which is added to the preexisting party spectrum.
Before and after suffrage extensions, politicians interested in improving or at least maintaining their competitive positions relative to others seek to attract new voters. To this end, they make promises, shift issue positions (mindful of the constraint imposed by their traditional supporters), extend their political organizations into previously ignored neighborhoods and regions, and, in general, attempt to mobilize and organize new voters. Party activists from parties not closely identified with the propertied classes and parties that have not done especially well in earlier elections with a more limited franchise tend to be especially active and especially successful in mobilizing new voters. They are less constrained by prior commitments, have more to gain from a possible realignment, and can make more credible promises to new voters.
The content of the promises made and the issue positions taken by party activists depends on who the new voters are. The kinds of policies offered to attract working-class votes will obviously differ from the kinds of promises used to attract multiclass groups such as women. When suffrage is extended in more or less class-based increments, parties that seek to mobilize and represent the interests of these new voters tend to be organized by politicians seeking to mobilize support (Coppedge, 1991) . In these circumstances, a class-based party system is likely to emerge. When, however, suffrage is extended to groups that span the entire class spectrum, there is no incentive to form class-based parties.
A sudden transition from extremely limited to universal political participation has more in common with the extension of the vote to women than it does with its extension to the working class. New voters span the interest continuum in the country, and catch-all or nationalist parties, whether old or new, are likely to be the result because parties will try to appeal to as large a segment of the electorate as possible.
This relationship between the rapidity of suffrage expansion and the kind of party system to emerge can be demonstrated for South America. In Latin America, literacy requirements were the most common way of excluding the lower classes from political participation. (In Argentina, a citizenship requirement was the functional equivalent of literacy; in 1912, when suffrage was extended to all male citizens, 60% of the working class consisted of noncitizens.) A literacy requirement in a stable democratic system with unchanging electoral laws would lead to an extremely incremental increase in suffrage as education spread to poorer children and they gradually came of age, which probably would have little effect on the party system. There are no cases that fit this hypothetical pattern in Latin America, however. Instead, mostly because of oscillations between authoritarianism and democracy, suffrage has expanded in chunks, sometimes class based and sometimes multiclass.
The combination of literacy requirements and authoritarian interludes results in an alternation between very incremental increases in participation during periods of democracy, interrupted by large jumps in participation at the end of periods of authoritarianism when large numbers of new voters enter the system. When these jumps are either quite large (as in Brazil in 1946, when suffrage was extended to the approximately 50% of the population that was literate) or quite small (as in Ecuador and Peru, where frequent military interventions and very high illiteracy kept the increments of new voters at the end of each one small), some class-based parties may emerge, but the system is likely to remain dominated by catch-all parties.
Where, however, either changes in electoral laws (as in Chile) or redemocratization (as in Argentina in 1946 8 ) led to extensions of suffrage to successively lower levels of the income pyramid, more or less class-based party systems have emerged. The scarcity of class-based parties in Eastern More or Less Class-Based System Argentina Chile a. "Early" is used here to indicate that a transition from extremely limited to virtually universal (sometimes male) suffrage occurred all at once, usually early in the frrst period of effective democracy. After subsequent authoritarian interludes, universal suffrage was restored. The dates and circumstances of suffrage expansions are as follows: Bolivia, 1952, after the revolution that began modem Bolivian political history; Colombia, 1936, when competitive politics reemerged after a long period of single-party dominance; Costa Rica, 1913; Uruguay, 1918; Venezuela, 1945 , at the beginning of the first democratic regime. All the countries in the "incremental" categories maintained literacy requirements (or the citizenship requirement in Argentina) until after World War II; Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru did so until the most recent redemocratizations during the late 1970s to mid-1980s.
Europe is often attributed to relative income equality, but note that classbased parties in Latin America are not associated with more unequal income distributions. Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile have the most equal income distributions in Latin America.
In those countries in which suffrage was initially expanded in one multiclass swoop and simply restored after authoritarian interludes, catch-all parties have been the norm, as shown in Table 3 . In all the new East European democracies, meaningful suffrage was granted to the entire population at once, and so we should not be surprised to see catch-all and nationalist parties rather than class-based parties.
THE WEAKNESS OF ORGANIZED INTEREST GROUPS
The tendency toward non-interest-based parties in Eastern Europe is further reinforced by the weakness of organized interest groups. Organized excluded the working class and much of the middle class from participation. It thus seems reasonable to me to treat the 1946 election as a redemocratization.
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Copyright (c) Sage Publications, Inc. interest groups play an important role in linking voters, especially the less educated and less interested ones, to parties that promise to represent their interests. Identifying which parties offer the most is a daunting task for a new voter facing a choice among dozens of new parties characterized by shifting and unclear positions on issues. Survey and electoral data available at this time suggest that voters in Eastern Europe do, in reality, find it hard to identify the parties that represent their interests. Based on a series of surveys conducted in Hungary in 1989 , Bruszt and Simon (1992 find no relationship between either class or socioeconomic attitudes and party choice, although class and attitude are correlated in expected ways. It may be unsurprising that the capital/labor cleavage has yet to emerge as the dominant one in Eastern Europe. In current circumstances, the conflict of interest between the public and private sectors may be the most acute. This cleavage, however, is also unpoliticized. The party preferences of state employees differ little from those of workers employed in the private sector (see Table 4 ). Organized interest groups, notably unions, perform the task of identifying representative parties for their members. They also supply parties with party workers who help to mobilize the vote of their members. In Spain, although the relationship beween class and party preference was generally weak, union members were markedly more likely to have stable partisan affiliations than were others during the first years after redemocratization (Barnes et al., 1985) . Communist-dominated unions are declining and fragmenting in Eastern Europe. New unions are being formed, but overall membership in unions has declined, in Hungary from 4.5 million to less than 2.5 million in the first year after the collapse (Bruszt & Simon, 1992, p. 196 ).
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CONSEQUENCES FOR PARTY SYSTEMS
Currently, East European party systems are dominated by parties not closely linked to economic interests. Most notably absent are labor parties, despite the availability of the raw material for them in the form of very large numbers of blue-collar workers and large numbers of people who express social democratic attitudes in their survey responses (Bruszt & Simon, 1992; Grabowska, 1993; Kolosi, Szelenyi, Szelenyi, & Western, 1992) .
Catch-all parties are not necessarily a bad thing; several of the countries with the longest and stablest democratic histories in Latin America (as well as the United States) have party systems dominated by two catch-all parties. Non-interest-based parties in highly fragmented party systems may, however, lead to disorder, volatility, and personalism because voters cannot easily identify the party that best represents their interests, and parties have few constraints on impulses to change programs and promises as they try to be all things to all voters. It may not be coincidental that Chile, the only Latin American country that has both a fragmented party system and a long history of successful democracy (except for the interlude between 1973 and 1989), has a class-based party system, as do most of the stable multiparty democracies in Western Europe.
Currently there are no two-party systems in Eastern Europe. The existence of multiple parties is to be expected in the wake of democratization, as many hopeful political leaders compete to establish themselves and their followings. How many survive will depend importantly on how electoral rules and other institutional features of the political system shape the incentives facing voters and candidates. In Latin America, two-party systems have developed and survived despite PR in countries with concurrent pluralitarian presidential elections-that is, in countries in which the president (running in a single national district) is elected without run-offs at the same time as the legislature (Shugart & Carey, 1992) . Presidents compete in single-member districts, and this, as Duverger noted long ago, tends to reduce the number of parties and thus balance the effects ofPR in legislative elections. Concurrent presidential elections and the absence of run-offs disadvantage small parties that have little chance of winning the presidency, whereas legislative and municipal elections held on a different cycle from presidential elections and run-offs encourage the survival of small parties. Small parties can often attract votes in elections that focus on local issues, in the absence of national coattail effects. And run-offs create an incentive for small parties to run candidates in the first round to be able to negotiate for more in exchange for their votes in the second round.
None of the East European countries examined for this study have concurrent elections without presidential run-offs. Hungary has a parliamentary system, with a president elected by the parliament. Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania have run-offs, and Bulgaria and Poland, like Brazil, also have nonconcurrent elections. By coincidence, 22 candidates ran in the first round of both the 1992 Bulgarian and the 1990 Brazilian presidential elections.
Hungary's half-majoritarian system of representation and the representation thresholds in the other East European countries can be expected to reduce fragmentation but will probably not result in two-party systems. We can expect, then, to see in Eastern Europe the survival of multiparty systems based on non-interest-based parties-a form of party system that has not proved to be especially stable in other parts of the world.
INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF NEW PARTIES
These institutional features of the new East European democracies are not, of course, exogenous to the transition; they were created during and immediately after the Leninist collapse by many of the same politicians who lead the current parties. These institutions are themselves a reflection of the newness of the party system and the interests of the political leaders of new parties.
Most of the time, political institutions remain stable because the political interests advantaged by particular institutions remain in power. At any particular time, the parties that dominate political life will tend to be those that are well adapted to functioning in the current institutional environment and that can benefit from its idiosyncrasies. New parties that have arisen during a regime transition, by contrast, are often not well adapted to the political rules in the old democratic constitution (if one existed). Consequently, they are much more likely to favor wiping the institutional slate clean and starting anew. The wholesale creation of new political institutions, such as has happened in Eastern Europe, should be expected during democratization only in two sets of circumstances: (a) if the party system has changed greatly during the authoritarian period rather than continuing to exist more or less unchanged underground or (b) if no institutionalized democratic system existed prior to authoritarian rule. In Latin America where, on average, authoritarian regimes resulted in much less dramatic changes in party systems, relatively few changes in the the institutions governing repre-sentation and elections occurred. In most cases, preauthoritarian constitutions and electoral rules were simply restored.
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One indication of the relationship between party survival and the stability of politicians' preferences with regard to institutions is that, during the Latin American transitions to democracy examined for this study, new constitutions were written only in those countries in which substantial change in the party system had occurred since the last civilian regime (see Table 5 ). Such change could result either from deliberate action by the authoritarian government (as in Brazil between 1965 and 1984) or from spontaneous political development. In all four East European countries examined, either new constitutions have been written or old ones have been very radically revised (Paczolay, 1993) by legislatures empowered to rewrite them, as would be expected.
The new constitutional provisions and laws written during and immediately after transitions will affect party fragmentation, discipline, and stability and, in consequence, political stability in the future. Initial institutional decisions were hammered out in negotiations between the Communists, or their successors, and one or more opposition groups, both concentrating on the immediate short-term effects of institutional choices on their own political viability. Outcomes varied with the perceived strength and hence bargaining power of the two sides, which changed over time as Communist parties declined. Outcomes were also influenced, especially in the second round of institutional changes, by the extent of opposition fragmentation. Fragmentation of both Communist and opposition parties increased over time (Engelbrekt, 1991 b; Engelbrekt & Perry, 1991; Mincheva, 1993; Perry, 1992; Shafir, 1992b; Topor, 1991; Vinton, 1990b Vinton, , 1990c Zubek, 1991) .
Communist parties enjoyed their greatest negotiating power while uncertainty prevailed about whether the Soviets would intervene in the internal affairs of East European countries, that is, prior to the fall of 1989. At the Polish roundtable in spring 1989, the Communists could get most of what they wanted in the institutional domain in return for legalization and minimal 9. In a few cases, restored constitutions and electoral rules included a small number of consequential changes enacted by the military government. The most important of these in this set of cases are the introduction of proportional representation (PR) by a military government in Argentina during the 1960s and the changes in electoral laws enacted by the Pinochet government in Chile. Where such changes are not reversed after the democratic regime has completed the transition, it is an indication that changes in the party system-and hence changes in the interests of politicians-have occurred, but the extent of change in these cases is less extensive than it is in the cases where a whole new constitution is written.
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New Constitution? Note. A "transition" is defined as including the time immediately before and for 5 years after an authoritarian government that ruled for more than a year relinquishes power to a competitive regime. A "competitive regime., is defined to include any regime in which competitive elections determine who holds political office, even if suffrage is restricted or some parties are prohibited from participating. a. The Aramburu military government set aside the Peronist constitution written in 1949 and reinstated the 1853 constitution that Per6n's had replaced. b. This constitution was written by a popularly elected constituent assembly before the military stepped down. c. The first Venezuelan democracy lasted only from 1945 to 1948, and only the frrst elections to various offices were held. It thus seems reasonable to treat 1958 as a case of "no prior history" despite this brief interlude. 1\vo of the most important Venezuelan parties after both transitions had existed (mostly underground) for a long time, but none had any experience as legal parties competing in the day-to-day struggle for reelection. participation for the opposition. "Solidarity did not seriously press for the holding of completely free elections" (Zubek, 1991, p. 361) .
Once East European Communists could no longer count on Soviet support, their bargaining strength declined, but, prior to the first elections and the relaxation of controls on the media, both Communist and opposition parties continued to overestimate Communist support. Even Polish Communist leaders, who were aware that they probably could not win open elections, thought they had enough support to control the transition, given the arrangement they had negotiated at the roundtable: the reservation of 65% of the seats in the Sejm for themselves and their allies and a strong president elected by the legislature, which they felt assured of controlling. Neither Solidarity nor the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) (Communist) predicted the extent of Solidarity's victory. "Even the worst predictions [of the Communists] saw Solidarity winning half of the seats, the PZPR 's coalition a third" (Zubek, 1991, p. 363) .
In the rest of Eastern Europe, Communist leaders also overestimated the resilience of their support. In consequence, when institutional negotiations took place before the first competitive elections, Communist parties tended to insist on institutional arrangements that would benefit a dominant party, such as a strong presidency and majoritarian forms of legislative representation.
The Communists' initial preference for majority systems had two sources besides overestimation of their own popularity: (a) the desire of many successor party politicians to run as individuals unhampered by the party label and (b) Communist control at the local level, intact in all cases, which provided Communist candidates with a preexisting local political machine and patronage network. If the electoral system remained unchanged, then incumbents expected to benefit from their local entrenchment.
Communists favored a presidency with substantial powers in part to insulate matters of defense and foreign policy (at this time still crucial to their relationship with the Soviet Union) from the vagaries of an unpredictable legislature and in part because they expected to control the office. With the Sejm elections rigged by the roundtable agreement, Polish Communists could count on the election of General J aruzelski by the combined houses of the legislature. Hungarian reform Communists confidently expected the election of one of their number, popular Imre Pozsgay. In Bulgaria, the prereform National Assembly had elected reform Communist Petar Mladenov to the presidency for a term expected to run throughout the term of the first elected legislature (Gavrilov, 1990b; Mincheva, 1993) . In Romania, it was expected that former Communist Ion Iliescu, president of the Council of the National Salvation Front when negotiations began, would win a popular election. Communists preferred an elected presidency where they expected to win a popular election (Hungary in late 1989 and Romania) because a popular election would confer more power and legitimacy on the holder of the office in any potential struggle with the legislature. But they preferred a president elected by parliament where mass opposition had already become apparent (i.e., Poland) or where the first presidential election was expected to occur in the uncertain future (Bulgaria).
In the first round of negotiations, Communists got most of what they wanted, as shown in Table 6 , which illustrates the institutional choices made at different stages of negotiation in the four East European countries. The left-hand column shows the fora within which institutional decisions were made, in chronological order for each country. The second column describes the strength of the Communist Party or its main successor in the relevant forum at the time when decisions were being made and lists the most important historical factors that affected Communist or successor party strength. The third column notes the most essential features of the presidency, and the fourth column notes the system of legislative representation chosen.
As the fourth column shows, in the initial stage of reform when the Communist Party was at its strongest, all electoral systems were at least partly majoritarian. In the systems with the strongest Communist or successor parties (Poland in spring 1989 and Romania in winter 1990), the first systems announced were not only entirely majoritarian but were not fully democratic. Poland's arrangement reserved 65% of the seats in the lower house for the PZPR and their coalition partners. Romania's senate included seats for 15 appointed military officers. Poland's first partly competitive election took place under these rules before Soviet withdrawal became certain. In Romania, however, where the Soviet threat no longer existed and Ceausescu had recently been overthrown in the wake of massive and violent demonstrations, a new wave of demonstrations forced the National Salvation Front (NSF) (Communist successor) to include opposition parties in a newly formed Provisional Council for National Unity and to negotiate with them over electoral rules, which resulted in the abandonment of the majoritarian system (Shafrr, 1990a (Shafrr, , 1990b .
In both Bulgaria and Hungary, reform Communists controlled nearly all the political resources in the country during initial negotiations but faced growing opposition and could no longer call on Soviet protection (Gavrilov, 1990a (Gavrilov, , 1990b Mincheva, 1993) . Communist negotiators compromised on institutional details in exchange for a timely agreement and early elections in an obviously deteriorating situation (Nikolaev, 1990) . The Hungarian Roundtable agreement was modified by an activist National Assembly dominated by reform Communists in the direction of greater majoritarianism (Pataki, 1990) .
As elections occurred, both inside each country and in other ex-Communist countries, assessments by all parties of Communist strength became more accurate, but uncertainty about which of the competing opposition groups would survive and prosper continued very high. Institutions designed or redesigned after the first round of elections tended to reflect this high level of uncertainty (Lijphart, 1992) . PR, which protects small parties from annihilation, was the universal choice in countries that devised electoral rules after the first open election. It was favored by almost all parties, both opposition and successor (Nikolaev, 1990; Vinton, 1990a, p. 16). 10 In all but Hungary, majoritarian features of systems of representation were abandoned in favor ofPR after initial elections (in Romania, demonstrations) led to the realization of their own potential weakness by successor parties that still controlled majorities in rule-making bodies. Most of the weak opposition parties of Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the highly fragmented opposition parties of Poland, also favored PR (McQuaid, 1991; Sabbat -Swidlicka, 1991; Vinton, 1990a) .
Only in Hungary did the first election result in control of the legislature for the opposition, a victory greatly magnified for the top party by features of the electoral system. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) received 24.4% of the vote in the first-round proportional districts but nearly 43% of the seats when the single-member districts and run-offs were added. The second largest party, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), also benefited very slightly, whereas all other parties were disadvantaged (Hibbing & Patterson, 1992, pp. 436-437) . Not surprisingly, the majority in the Hungarian National Assembly saw no reason to change a system that had treated them so well.
Parties that contained charismatic personalities who had gained name recognition and popular respect for their opposition to the Communist regime favored open-list PR. A large number of votes for particular well-known names on the party list can elect other unknown candidates. Jan Bielecki's 115,002 votes, for example, also elected Liberal candidates Pavel Piskowski with 589 votes and Jacek Kurczewski with 588 (Millard, 1992, p. 851) . Parties with fewer well-known personalities, and disciplined parties with entrenched dominant leaders, preferred the more standard closed list (McQuaid, 1991) . Closed-list PR enhances party discipline and the power of party leaders relative to members because leaders determine the order of the list and hence candidates' electoral chances. The Democratic Union in Poland, which included most of the famous Solidarity activists except Walesa, and a number of other small Polish opposition parties favored the open list. Most Communist and successor parties 11 and most other opposition parties favored the closed list. Poland is the only country in this set in which the opposition had been sufficiently widespread and effective to have produced a large number of well-known opposition figures prior to the first fully competitive 10. See Geddes (in press) for a discussion of the few parties that continued to favor majoritarian forms of legislative representation and their reasons for doing so. election. In Hungary, the best-known reformers were concentrated inside the Communist party and thus unavailable as opposition heroes. A singlemember district system would seem to serve the interests of reform Communists better than open-list PR because single-member districts lead to an emphasis on individual politicians while downplaying the party label.
Changes in the manner of electing the president also occurred in the second round of institutional negotiations. Communist plans for the presidency went awry first in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Bulgaria, reform Communist President Mladenov was unexpectedly forced to resign by popular demonstrations. As a result, a new president had to be elected by theN ational Assembly more than a year early. The largest party in the assembly, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) (Communist successor), could not muster the two-thirds vote needed to elect a Socialist. They were forced to agree to the election of opposition leader Zhelyu Zhelev by other parties' refusal to cooperate with them and the threat of new parliamentary elections, in which they expected to lose seats, if they failed to elect someone (Mincheva, 1993; Nikolaev, 1992; Perry, 1990) . The constitution adopted in July 1991 by the same National Assembly, and also requiring a two-thirds majority, provides for a popularly elected president with limited powers. Many members of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) opposed the limitation on presidential powers but accepted this and a number of other compromises to end debilitating conflict over the constitution (Engelbrekt, 1991 a) . Zhelev won the first competitive presidential election by a narrow margin in January 1992.
In Hungary, two opposition parties refused to sign the roundtable agreement and led a campaign for a referendum to postpone presidential elections until after the election of a democratic parliament. The referendum passed and, as a result, not only was the election postponed, but the power to define the scope of the presidency and mode of election passed to the new legislature. The legislature, jealous of its own prerogatives, decided to elect the president itself and limit the powers of the presidency. Hungary has the weakest presidency of the four countries, with Bulgaria the next weakest.
In Poland, Communist plans for the presidency went awry even more spectacularly; not only did the Communists lose control of the office, but the presidency remained strong in the hands of their most famous opponent. Approximately a year after his election, General Jaruzelski was persuaded to resign by a popular campaign for a freely elected presidency mounted by Lech Walesa and one faction of Solidarity. After Walesa's election in December 1990, the Roundtable Sejm fought tooth and nail to limit presidential powers (Vinton, 1991 (Vinton, a, 1991 , fighting Walesa to a standstill on many issues but never managing to curtail presidential powers. The "little constitution," promulgated in fall 1992, clarifies the roles of the president, prime minister, and legislature and is expected to reduce conflict, but it leaves the Polish presidency relatively strong (Vinton, 1992) .
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The parties that support a strong presidency in Poland have shifted with the shifting winds of Walesa's alliances. In the months following Walesa's election, the Center Alliance, the faction of Solidarity that had supported his presidential campaign, fought for a strong presidency while the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna), the faction of Solidarity that had supported Mazowiecki in the election, sought to limit the powers of the presidency. After late 1991, when Walesa reestablished cooperation with the Democratic Union, these positions were reversed. In short, whichever party or alliance controls the presidency or expects to control it in the near future supports broad powers for the president, whereas parties in opposition to the president seek to limit the president's powers.
Only in Romania, where the successor party itself remained strong for some time, was it able to maintain control of the presidency. Ion Iliescu of the NSF won the first popular election in May 1990. The new Romanian constitution, drafted by the National Assembly dominated by the NSF, in 1991 reaffirmed the powers of the presidency (Shafir, 1991 (Shafir, , 1992a . And Iliescu was reelected in September 1992.
In short, a series of decisions that have great influence on the extent of party fragmentation, the existence of party discipline, and the level of conflict among president, government, and parliament-and hence have great influence on the efficacy of economic policymaking and the stability of future governments-have been made on the basis of short-term political interests.
The constitutions written after Latin American democratizations also reflect the short-term interests of those who wrote them. All include the institution of the presidency, reflecting the presidential aspirations of the leaders of the most important parties in constituent assemblies. In all but Argentina (1949), multiple parties were represented, and there was considerable uncertainty about future party strength. Electoral rules in all cases except that of Argentina mandated PR. In Argentina, the assembly that wrote the 1949 constitution was heavily dominated by Peronists, who initiated a majoritarian system rather than switching to PR. Majoritarian systems advantage the largest party in the legislature along with the next runner-up in each district, which in Argentina varies across regions. The system ensured a majority to the largest party and severely disadvantaged smaller parties. Latin American constitutions written in the wake of democratization show much greater continuity with earlier democratic constitutions than do current East European constitutions with their predecessors because of the greater continuity of both parties and individuals in Latin America~ven in countries such as Brazil that have experienced the greatest change.
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CONCLUSION
The modal institutional pattern that has emerged in Eastern Europe as a result of the series of decisions discussed in this essay is one that includes both a popularly elected president, whose powers relative to the government (i.e., prime minister and cabinet) are somewhat vague, and a parliament filled with numerous, mostly catch-all parties. The existence of both a president (elected in all but Hungary) and a prime minister mostly responsible to parliament distinguishes the East European systems from the Latin American presidential-PR systems 14 and has already led to strife between the two executives, most intense in the countries with the strongest presidencies, Poland and Romania, but present even in Hungary, where both executives are chosen by the same body. It can be expected that conflict between the two executives over high appointments and basic policy decisions regarding the economy and other crucial issues will recur frequently during the next few years until precedents delimiting their spheres become established as a result of the political struggles currently occurring. This conflict, of course, carries with it some potential for policy immobilism and political instability.
The party systems composed of multiple catch-all parties can be expected to lead to frequent cabinet reshuffles, multiparty coalition governments, and minority governments. These cabinet characteristics carry with them the potential for governmental chaos, immobilism, being held hostage by small single-issue parties, and lengthening the time during which the conflict between the two executives remains intense. At the same time, the party system should be conducive to a fairly flexible and pragmatic parliamentary politics. The raw material for the kind of intransigent standoff between the largest party in parliament and the president that helped precipitate and legitimate military interventions in Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, and Peru in 1968 seems simply not to exist in the current East European party systems.
13. See Hagopian (1992) for a discussion of the survival of individual politicians and their informal followings despite changes in the party system in Brazil.
14. Peru has a prime minister in principle responsible to the legislature, and in fact removable by it, but always in practice appointed at the discretion of the president. Now that all countries have representation thresholds, fragmentation so extreme that it becomes difficult to form a cabinet at all should become less likely. A certain amount of fragmentation may actually be useful because it multiplies the number of possible coalitions. Bulgaria, with only three parties in parliament, has had great difficulty forming governments. The weakness of the parties' ideologial commitments should also increase coalitional flexibility.
As a result of these characteristics, I would expect intellectuals and ordinary citizens alike to perceive their governments as disorderly, inefficient, irritating, opportunistic, squabbling, and petty. These attitudes are likely to be exaggerated in countries in which electoral institutions, such as the open list in Poland and the single-member districts in Hungary, undermine party discipline. 15 In both open-list and single-member systems, party leaders lose one of the principal tools for enforcing party discipline: their control over placement on the list. Where party discipline is weak, the public is treated to the sight of even more chaotic squabbling in parliament because there are not only several parties but also many individual warriors determined to make their mark in the public eye or bring the bacon home to their own constituencies.
Democracy, in these circumstances, will not be a pretty sight. It will offend observers with a penchant for order and logic. There is considerable survey evidence to suggest that many East Europeans have already developed quite low opinions of their governments. Nevertheless, there is no reason to expect democracy in the countries that have established it in Eastern Europe to be especially fragile. Low opinions of government, especially the legislature, are common even in long-lived stable democracies, and disenchantment with democracy 16 is a standard feature of transitions, especially if the years following democratization coincide with hard times.
To summarize, the Leninist political legacy in Eastern Europe consists of a large number of new parties scrambling desperately to achieve a niche in the new democratic environment that will ensure their survival. The intense and unstructured competition for support has led to high levels of both opportunism and vagueness in their policy positions and promises to the public. The struggle for a competitive edge has also shaped the choice of particular new democratic institutions. These institutions, devised to confer immediate political advantage on particular individuals and parties, are not 15. R6na-Tas (1991) demonstrates that members of the Hungarian assembly elected from single-member districts were less disciplined than members elected by PR.
16. The tenn desencanto (disenchantment) was coined to refer to the drop in support for democracy that occurred in Spain during the years immediately after the transition. the ones that would have been chosen by a benign god intent on making the transitional period as smooth, orderly, and reassuring as possible. Instead, they have increased the chaos and insecurity that inevitably accompany radical political changes. Nevertheless, a broad comparison between the new East European democracies and other countries with democratic experience suggests that these new democracies will probably survive the institutional choices made by their own democratic politicians.
Periods of rapid institutional change occur rarely. Most of the time, institutions, like species, change only incrementally. Vested interests in political institutions develop with amazing rapidity. Political institutions chosen during the brief periods of rapid institutional evolution that punctuate the much longer and more common periods of institutional inertia can thus be expected to have long-term consequences. As can be seen in the final time period for each country in Table 6 , the pace of institutional change in Eastern Europe seems already to be slackening. There will undoubtedly be upheavals in some countries, but, nevertheless, it appears that a period of greater institutional stability has arrived. For countries able to maintain competitive systems, the institutions created during the last few years are likely to structure politics for a long time. For countries that undergo periods of authoritarianism in the future, redemocratization can be expected to bring in its train a return to many of the institutions recently created.
Where democratic political institutions take root-however shallowlyduring post-Leninist transitions, they create a set of compelling incentives that structure the behavior of political elites. This behavior depends not on the internalization of democratic ideals but only on the self-interested behavior of politicians in democratic institutional settings. Among the dynamics inherent in competitive systems, however flawed, is (a) the tendency of aspiring political leaders to mobilize previously excluded groups into the political game to support their own challenges to established leaders and (b) the tendency of leadership competition to lead to party splits. As a result, even narrow and flawed democracies contain within them forces that often lead, over the long term, to more inclusionary and more competitive political systems.
The cultural legacies of Leninism hostile to democracy will not, of course, disappear overnight. Neither, however, are cultural traits static or indefinitely self-perpetuating. To persist, they must be reinforced by formal and informal institutions (Jowitt, 1974) . To the extent that the cultural legacies of the Leninist experience are inconsistent with democratic institutions, they are currently being eroded in the countries of Eastern Europe in which democracy holds sway. And the longer these institutions persist, the greater the erosion will be. Some of the currently democratic countries of Eastern Europe will probably suffer authoritarian interludes in the future. These interludes, however, will not wipe away the legacy of democracy now being created any more than authoritarian interludes in Latin America have done in those countries.
